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Comparatively Speaking: The "Honor" of the "East"
and the "Passion" of the ''West"*
Lama Abu-Odeh••
I. INTRODUCTION

In a previously published work/ I discussed crimes of honor in
the Arab world. A paradigmatic example of a crime of honor is the
killing of a woman by her father or brother for engaging in, or being
suspected of engaging in, sexual practices before or outside marriage. On a simple and immediate level, I called for an end to these
crimes because of their obvious cruelty. All Arab laws or judicial
practices that legitimize or sanction these crimes should be abolished.
On a more complicated level, I attempted to identify the role
that these crimes play in the production and reproduction of gender
relations in contemporary Arab life. I contended that these relations
are the outcome of a complex triangular interaction between social
violence (the crime of honor itself), state violence (the attempt to
regulate this crime), and the response by contemporary men and
women to the balance between these two types of violence.
I argued that in the past, the crimes have gone largely unregulated, practiced as a means of controlling the violators by punishing
them for vice and deviancy from the prescribed sexual rules. However, despite the fact that crimes of honor continue to exist to this day
and do so on a significant scale, I argued that their social function
has become different.
The intervention of the Arab nationalist elite in the social field
(by desegregating gendered social space) has rendered the concept of
sexual honor ambiguous. Their intervention in the legal field,
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through codification, had the purpose of modernizing a traditional
practice (crimes of honor) by defining the limits of its practice (sanctioning it by penalizing the violators in certain cases). The legal
move that they made could be seen as a means of containing the
practice of crimes of honor.
The mushrooming of diverse sexual types (the sexy virgin, the
virgin of love, the "slut") and sexual practices among women and
men are a response, I argued, to the interaction between the social
violence and its regulation by means of state violence. There is an
added complexity due to the fact that the judicial practice through
the Arab world of judging incidents of honor has served a double
function: trying to contain the practice of the crimes while also
attempting to co-opt the emergence of new subversive sexual types.
The end picture has the complicated appearance of the crimes being
a response to the new sexual practices (their contemporary function), the state regulation and judicial practice being a response to
the violence and the sexual practices, and the resistant sexual types
being a response to the balance between the two types of violence,
both social and state.
If indeed the demand to completely abolish crimes of honor is
unrealistic, I argued that these crimes, insofar as their legal sanction is concerned, should be reduced to those of passion. This is a
viable move because the spectrum of codification of crimes of honor
in the Arab world already has within its parameters the legal construct of a crime of passion, as in the cases of Algeria and Egypt. 2
What seems to preempt the full development of the idea of passion
in these two respective countries is judicial practice which uses alternative legal means to reintroduce the idea of a crime ofhonor.3

2. In Egypt, for instance, the only killing that is considered to be partially
excused (manslaughter) in such a context is when the wife is caught red-handed by
her husband committing adultery. See EGYPI'IAN PENAL CODE art. 237 (No. 58, 1937).
The Egyptian crime of passion is thus defined in almost exactly the same terms as
the one nineteenth-century U.S. common law treated as a crime of passion committed
on account of the wife's adultery. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
LAW 477 (1987) (noting "observation by a husband of his wife committing adultery"
constituted adequate provocation under common law); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AUSTIN W. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 575 (1972) ("It is the law practically
everywhere that a husband who discovers his wife in the act of committing adultery
is reasonably provoked.").
3. When I wrote my previous article, what I had in mind as constituting the
crime of passion that I thought was the more desirable option to a crime of honor
was the one defined as "killing the wife (and/or paramour) when caught committing
adultery" such as the one recognized by the American common law. See Abu-Odeh,
supra note 1. I had argued that the move from crimes of honor to this kind of crime
resulted in narrowing the pool of the female victims of such crimes from wife, moth-
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In this Article, I will attempt a comparative review by examining in the United States the crime that has the most affinity with
the crime of honor in the Arab World: the killing of women in the
heat of passion for sexual or intimate reasons, which is seen in the
United States as one of many instances in which the more generic
crime of passion can occur. For the purposes of this Article, I will
use the term "crime of passion" as it is so specifically defined. The
reason for the exercise is to locate precisely the meaning of the
proposition historically circulated in the orientalist tradition4 but
also shared by Euro-American popular culture that while the West
has "passion" the East has ''Honor."5 What is the meaning of this
difference? Where can we locate it exactly? What does it mean that
a legal system, such as the one in the United States, is purportedly
invested purely in the idea of passion? Can the United States be
seen as a progressive ideal where the idea of passion has been incorporated more successfully than it has been in the Arab World? Is
the passion of the United States legal system one that Arab women
should aspire to reign in the legal system of their own countries?
Are American women better off, worse than, or simply situated
differently from Arab women? How do the two respective legal systems, when it comes to the passion/honor of men, intersect with
and/or depart from each other? How is the Arab judiciary's relationer, sister, and daughter to wife only. See id. at 142.
4. For a definition of "orientalism" as discourse and system of knowledge and
power, see EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 31-46 (1978).
Orientalism was a library or archive of information commonly, and in some
of its aspects, unanimously held. What bound the archive together was a
family of ideas and a unifying set of values proven in various ways to be
effective. These ideas explained the behavior of Orientals; they supplied
Orientals with a mentality, a genealogy, an atmosphere; most important,
they allowed Europeans to deal with and even to see Orientals as a phenomenon possessing regular characteristics. But like any set of durable
ideas, Orientalist notions influenced the people who were called Orientals as
well as those called Occidental, European or Western. . . . If the essence of
Orientalism is the ineradicable distinction between Western superiority and
Oriental inferiority, then we must be prepared to note how in its development and subsequent history Orientalism deepened and even hardened the
distinction.
ld. at 41-42. For an example of the internalization of orientalist ideas while reversing their meanings, see Richard Fox, East of Said, in EDWARD SAID: A CRITICAL
READER 152 (Michael Sprinkler ed., 1992) ("What appeared in pejorative Orientalism
as India's ugliness now became India's beauty; her so-called weaknesses tuned out to
be her strengths. Other worldliness became spirituality, an Indian cultural essential
that promised her a future cultural perfection unattained in the West. Passiveness
became at first passive resistance and later nonviolent resistance.").
5. The comparison with the Arab context will obviously mean that Arab will be
a stand-in for the Oriental in this instance.
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ship to the "rage" of the dishonored Arab man different from or similar to that of the American judiciary's relationship to the rage of
the jealous American man?
In this Article, I will argue that a comparative analysis of the
legally sanctioned violence against women (for intimate or sexual
reasons), of both the Arab legal system and that of the American,
reveals the fallacy of both the orientalist construction that the East
is different from the West and the almost contradictory idea of international feminism that all violence against women all over the
world is the same. 6 I will argue that there are deep similarities
between the internal tensions within each legal system as to what
constitutes a killing of women that is legally tolerated (either fully
or partially), and that these tensions, although sometimes defined
differently, have been surprisingly resolved in the same way. Or put
differently, the Arab judiciary has resorted to alternative legal concepts available7 in the various Arab Penal Codes, the most important of which is that of killing in a fit of fury, to release the honor
crime from the shackles of some passion requirements (surprise and
flagrante delicto) attached to it and redeem for it its earlier traditional integrity and coherence. This Arab killing in a fit of fury is in
fact uncannily similar to the American category of extreme emotional distress (''EED") (enshrined in the Model Penal Codes (''MPC")).
EED represents the most extreme instance in the United States
legal system of a historical progression towards "subjectifying''8 the
test according to which a killing is considered to have been committed while the actor (mostly man) was in a state of passion. 9 The
coming to the scene of the EED in its American and Arab garb (fit

6. See, e.g., Melissa Spatz, A Lesser Crime: A Comparative Study of Legal De·
fenses for Men Who Kill Their Wives, 24 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 597 (1991).
7. These legal concepts include "killing in a fit of fury" in Jordan, see JORDANIAN PENAL CODE art. 98 (No. 16, 1960); "the provocation rule" and "the honorable
motive rule" in Syria, see SYRIAN PENAL CODE arts. 192, 242 (No. 148, 1949); and
the "extenuating circumstances rule" in Egypt, see EGYPTIAN PENAL CODE art. 17
(No. 58, 1937). See Abu-Odeh, supra note 1, at 165-66.
8. What I mean by "subjectifying" the test is the idea that the passion of the
violent man becomes this particular man's subjective experience which nobody else is
capable of challenging or contradicting. In other words, there are no objective standards (pre-defined categories of provocation, or alternatively the standard of the "reasonable man" to be used to judge the validity of the passion of this man). See Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106
YALE L.J. 1331, 1340 (1997) (arguing that EED applied in the MPC jurisdictions
allows increased legal tolerance of violence against women and ties women to men in
emotional unity).
9. EED, in whole or in part, is applied in 11 states and two territories. See id.
at 1340 n.52, 1345 n.88.
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of fury), has led to the tolerance in both places of an increasing
variety of violence against women (American and Arab). 10
I say this, while contending at the same time that there remains a sharp cultural cleavage between the Arab and the American legal systems: the killing of daughters, sisters, and mothers, for
their sexual conduct, seems to be rarely ever tolerated in the American system (as opposed to wives, ex-wives, girlfriends, and ex-girlfriends). While the legal radical feminist line that there is violence
against women all over the world is correct, it reveals its own
Eurocentric bias by arguing that "international action is needed to
protect wives around the world"11 because "the . . . analysis suggests . . . internationally shared attitudes about women's worth,
their proper role and men's ownership rights in their wives."12 My
analysis will reveal that the killing of ''wives" is more of a cultural
projection by these feminists on other parts of the world. In the
Arab world, unlike in the United States, it is mostly "daughters"
and "sisters" that are getting killed.
In Part I of this Article, I will try to delineate what I believe to
be the differences between a regime of honor and that of passion as
forms of violence against women. I will do that by representing each
as an ideal type. In Part IT I will show how when embodied culturally, elements of both ideal types coexist together in one legal system albeit in tension with each other. I will first show how in the
Arab Penal Codes the tension between passion and honor is a feature of these Codes both as they compare with each other and inherently in the very construction of each one of these Codes. In Part
Ill I will argue that a similar tension, between passion and honor,
exists in the United States criminal legal system. An example of
this is the division of jurisdictions into those applying the commonlaw categories of what constitutes adequate provocation13 and
those that use the EED defense adopted by the Model Penal
Code(s).14 One is led to treat the common-law categories as representing American honor legally constructed in criminal matters
(tracing back to the nineteenth century), and EED as the competing
idea of passion, a more recent phenomenon historically, with deep
affinity to the move to liberalize legal defenses in American crimi-

10. See
11. See
12. Id.
13. See
14. See
combination

id. at 1334.
Spatz, supra note 6, at 638.
id. at 1346.
supra text accompanying note 9. There are also jurisdictions that use a
of both. See Spatz, supra note 6, at 1346.
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nallaw. 15
In Part IV, I will try to show how the attempt to resolve the
tension between the elements of honor and those of passion in the
Arab criminal legal system by the Arab judiciary, to force it to be
more honor-based, leads to more legal tolerance of violence against
women. 16 In like manner, the move in the American legal system,
this time to be more passion-based, leads equally to more legal
tolerance of violence against women in the United States. Interestingly, it will turn out that the honor of one (the American) is the
passion of the other (the Arab), while the passion of one (the American) echoes the norms of the honor of the other (the Arab). In Part
V, I will argue that the fluidity of this picture goes against the
grain of the construction of difference between the East and the
West both by orientalism17 and reverse-orientalism/8 as well as
the construction of similarity between them by international radical
feminism. 19
II. HONOR AND PASSION AS IDEAL TYPES
At first, I will attempt to delineate what I believe to be the
differences between a regime of honor and that of passion as forms
of violence against women. I will do that by representing each as an
ideal type.
The idea of honor is based on the notion of justification, where
the stress is on the nature of the act, rightful or not, not the actor.20 Self-defense is the paradigmatic example of an act that is
justified. 21 Alternatively, the idea of passion is based on the notion
of excuse. "It is always actors who are excused, not acts. The act
may be harmful, wrong, and even illegal, but it might not tell us
what kind of person the actor is."22 It appeals to our sense of compassion for human weakness in the face of unexpected, overwhelming circumstances. 23
15. See Spatz, supra note 6, at 1379-84.
16. See supra text accompanying note 7.
17. See supra text accompanying note 4.
18. See supra text accompanying note 4.
19. See supra note 6.
20. See Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a
Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 436-37 (1982) ("[W]ith homicide . . .
the existence of justification implies that under the circumstances, society either does
not believe that the death of the human being was undesirable, or that it at least
represents a lesser harm than if the defendant had not acted as he did.").
21. See id. at 437.
22. George P. Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1269, 1271 (1974).
23. "To partially excuse homicide is to recognize that external forces and human
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Flagrante delicto24 is not an absolute requirement in a regime
of honor, whereas it is in the case of passion. Since in the former
situation what is most crucial is the "dishonorability'' of the act
committed by the victim, 25 whether the actor is caught red-handed
is irrelevant. 26 In the latter situation, however, the actor commits
the crime in a fit of fury having lost control over his reason. 27 The
element of flagrante delicto is therefore key, since it supports the
context in which the actor has "flipped."28 This is less a moral judgment and more a recognition of, and sympathy with, the actor's
jealousy when confronted with the act of sexual betr;:tyal. Whereas
the idea of fit of fury is also acknowledged in the case of honor (a
dishonored man also flips), the necessity to avenge the dishonor survives the initial moment of fury, so that the crime is conceivable
after that. There is, however, no excuse in the case of passion for
action that occurs after the initial moment of rage has elapsed.
Anyone dishonored can commit a crime of honor, which means
that more than one man may be implicated in the incident of dishonor, including a father, brother, son, husband-and sometimes-even an uncle or cousin. 29 Therefore any one of these individuals could commit the crime. Dishonoring is a collective injury.
In contrast, only somebody sexually connected to the woman, primarily her husband, can be excused for committing a crime of passion; passion is an individual injury.30
Any dishonorable action justifies intervention by the one who is
dishonored. 31 This could cover a case of flagrante delicto adultery,
attitude equivoque, or "unlawful bed." The idea of honor embraces a
broad spectrum of actions by the dishonoring party far exceeding
that of sexual betrayal. Only incidents of sexual betrayal can occasion a crime of passion, since it is only the person sexually connected to the woman who can be excused.
In sum, honor is based on ideas of kin, status, honor, and
collectivity, while passion is based on ideas of individualism, roman-

weaknesses render some intentional killings understandable, though reprehensible."
Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Prouoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion
Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1679, 1679 (1986).
24. "Flagrante delicto" means "[i]n the very act of committing the crime."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 639 (6th ed. 1990).
25. It is based on a moral judgment on that act.
26. See Abu-Odeh, supra note 1, at 155.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 154.
30. See id. at 155.
31. See id. at 148-51.
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tic fusion, and sexual jealousy.
III. HONOR AND PASSION IN THE ARAB CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM

In this part I will try to show the particular legal cross-existence of honor and passion in the Arab legal system, both comparatively between the various codes and internally within the code
itself, taking as my example the Jordanian Penal Code.
Arab Penal Codes differ among themselves, I have argued elsewhere, on three issues: (1) the scope of application of the excuse32
in terms of the act committed by the woman; (2) the kind of excuse
granted to the man committing the killing, whether total or partial;
and (3) who benefits from the excuse.33 I noted that some
codes-the Egyptian, Tunisian, Libyan, and the Kuwaiti-limited
the application of the excuse to situations of adultery, where the
excuse was only partial. Others expanded the application of the
excuse beyond adulterr4 to include situations of "unlawful bed"
(Jordanian) or "attitude equivoque" (Syrian and Lebanese), where
the excuse was partial. The Iraqi Code was unique in that it covered both the situation of adultery and what it called ''her presence
in one bed with her lover'' and the excuse granted was partial in
both cases. As to ''who benefits from the excuse," I noted that the
Syrian and Lebanese Codes adopted the French terminology ''wife,
female ascendants, descendants, and sister" so that the husband,
the son, the father, and the brother benefited from the excuse. The
Jordanian Code, on the other hand, used the French terminology as
well as the Ottoman expression ''wife or female unlawfuls," thereby
expanding to a large degree the number of beneficiaries of the excuse.35 The Iraqi Code used an expression similar to that of the
Jordanian one, namely, ''his wife or one of his female unlawfuls" to
cover both cases of adultery and "one bed." The Egyptian, Kuwaiti,
and Tunisian Codes limited the beneficiaries to that of the husband,
and the Libyan Code to that of the husband, father, and brother.
The Algerian Code was unique in that it treated both husband and
wife as beneficiaries of the excuse, which it limited to situations of

32. Either exemption from punishment (total excuse) or reduction in penalty
(partial excuse). See id. at 144-45.
33. See id.
34. Where the excuse granted was total.
35. This expands the beneficiaries to a considerable degree (at least formally
speaking) since a female unlawful includes every woman that the man cannot marry
either for blood, marriage (in-law), or nursing reasons (which makes the disparity
between the first and second section of the article quite significant and almost mysterious).
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adultery. 36
Therefore I have argued that, comparatively speaking (among
themselves), these codes seem to be distributed on a spectrum with
two opposite poles. The first is best exemplified by the Algerian
Code, where both husband and wife benefit from a reduction of
penalty when s/he catches the other committing adultery. The opposite pole is best exemplified by the Jordanian Code, where many
men benefit from both a reduction and an exemption of penalty if
they catch one of their female unlawfuls committing adultery or in
an unlawful bed with her lover. The difference between these two
ends, I argued, may very well be the difference between the idea of
a crime of passion (the former) and a crime of honor (the latter).37
Such incorporation of diverse elements also exists in the codes
themselves, I have argued, as part of their inherent construction,
which is best exemplified by the Jordanian Penal Code.38 In that
code, the locus of the crime of honor is Article 340. The first article
of three in a section entitled "Excuse in Murder," Article 340 provides:
(1) He who catches his wife, or one of his (female) unlawfuls committing adultery with another, and he kills, wounds, or injures one
or both of them, is exempt from any penalty.
(2) He who catches his wife, or one of his (female) ascendants, descendants or sisters with another in an unlawful bed, and he kills
or wounds or injures one or both of them, benefits from a reduction
of penalty.39

Article 340 owes its historical origin to two legal sources when it
comes to the issue of "crimes of honor." These two sources are the
Ottoman Penal Code of 1858 and the French Penal Code of 1810.
From the Ottoman Code, Article 340 of the Jordanian Penal
Code adopted the expressions "female unawfuls" and "unlawful
bed." From the French Code, the article borrowed the expression
"ascendante, descendante" and the idea of a partial excuse as stated
in the second section of the article, "une excuse attenuante.'>4°
An article such as Article 340, with its cultural hybridity as
legal construct, exists in almost every other Arab Penal Code. The
internal tension between passion and honor is reflected in the cohabitation in the article above, of elements that seem to belong to
the world of passion (flagrante delicto, partial excuse) with those

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See Abu-Odeh, supra note 1, at 189 n.6.
See supra note 32.
See supra note 7.
JORDANIAN PENAL CODE art. 340 (No. 16, 1960).
See Abu-Odeh, supra note 1, at 143-44.
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that belong to the world of honor (unlawful bed, total excuse). Such
hybridity/tension is inherent in the system requiring the Arab judiciary to constantly negotiate these conflictual and contradictory
elements to try to achieve a semblance of stability in the system.
IV. HONOR AND PASSION IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM

One way of representing honor and passion in the United
States context is through historical narrative. The narrative would
look something like this: A crime of passion in the United States is
usually included in the legal literature under the doctrinal concept
of "provocation." This is so because "[a]n intentional homicide committed in a sudden rage of passion engendered by adequate provocation, and not the result of malice conceived before the provocation,
is voluntary manslaughter."41 Provocation is a judicial construction
that developed in England at a time when all homicides were punishable by death. 42 The idea was that homicides committed as a
result of provocation should be treated differently from other homicides, and it therefore developed that provocation reduced a charge
from murder to manslaughter.43
Provocation has undergone many changes since its original
formulation. It initially stressed the subjective state of mind of the
accused; therefore, a defendant was required to prove loss of selfcontrol to show that the homicide was committed without malice. 44
Eventually the courts established categories of events considered
sufficiently provocative to confute the presumption of malice and
thereby objectified the standard of provocation.45 These categories
are known as the "common-law categories of adequate provocation"
and they were few and specific: serious battery, aggravated assault,
mutual combat, commission of a serious crime against a close relative, unlawful arrest, and the observation by a husband of his wife
committing adultery. 46 This view held that the adequacy of the
provocation was a matter of law to be determined by the courts.47

41. RoLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 84 (3d ed. 1982)
(emphasis added).
42. See Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man
Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
435, 446-47 (1981).
43. See Taylor, supra note 23, at 1684-85.
44. See id. at 1685.
45. See id.
46. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 477.
47. See id.
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However, it has come to be considered over the years that such a
view was not feasible ''because provocation may be given under an
infinite variety of circumstances.'>48 Judges have therefore developed the "reasonable man" standard as an "objective" formula to
determine whether there were events or circumstances sufficient to
have provoked a reasonable man. The task of the court is to explain
the standard to the jury, and the task of the jury is to apply the
standard to the facts. 49 In State v. Watkins, 50 a case in which a
man killed another man after his lover of eight years abandoned
him to marry the latter, the court described the reasonable man in
the following way:
Reasonableness is the test. The law contemplates the case of a
reasonable man-an ordinary, reasonable man-and requires that
the provocation shall be such as might naturally induce such a
man, in the anger of the moment, to commit the deed. The rule is
that reason should at the time of the act be disturbed by passion to
an extent which might render ordinary men, of fair, average disposition, liable to act rashly and without reflection, and from passion
rather than judgment.5 1

The category of the reasonable man has been subjected to a
great deal of discussion over the years about who exactly this reasonable man is and what individual peculiarities should be taken
into account when judging the adequacy of provocation. 52 This
then, the narrative continues,53 leads to the Model Penal Code formulation which introduces a significant amount of subjective consideration to the test of the reasonable man without giving it up completely. These formulations include ones such as a person who in-

PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 41, at 86.
See Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212 (1862).
127 N.W. 691 (Iowa 1910).
Id. at 692. Following is an example of the way legal doctrine has expounded
standard:
(1) There must have been a reasonable provocation. (2) The defendant must have been in fact provoked. (3) A reasonable man so provoked
would not have cooled off in the interval of time between the provocation
and the delivery of the fatal blow. (4) The defendant must not in fact have
cooled off during that interval.
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, at 573.
52. See id. at 578.
53. Whether the provocative act is defined objectively by the court as a question
of law or whether it is the reasonable man standard, provocation as a defense in
criminal law treatises typically has the following requirements: {1) killing committed
in a heat of passion; (2) in response to an adequately provocative act; (3) the killing
must be sudden and no cooling time has passed; and (4) a calusal relation between
provocation, passion, and fatal act is established. See, e.g., PERKINS & BOYCE, supra
note 40, at 85.
48.
49.
50.
51.
on this
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tentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes circumstances to
be such that, if they existed, would justify the killing, but his belief
is unreasonable. 54 Others provide that a homicide which would
otherwise be considered murder is only manslaughter if "committed
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for
which there is reasonable explanation or excuse," the reasonableness
of which is to be "determined from the viewpoint of a person in the
actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to
be."ss

It is notable that when killing women in a heat of passion was
a common-law category, it was tolerated only under very strict conditions defined as such. These conditions "required proof that the
defendant actually witnessed the physical act of intercourse between his wife and the paramour."56 However, and corresponding
with the progressive subjectifying of the provocation defense, these
requirements came to be given more ''liberal" meanings. This had
already started to take place with Price v. State. 57
As a crime, adultery itself may be established and proven by
circumstantial testimony. Should the law hold the husband to a
greater or higher degree of proof than itself requires to establish a
given fact? ...
. . . As to a proper construction of the expression taken in the
act, we cannot believe that the law requires or restricts the right of
the husband to the fact that he must be an eye-witness to physical
coition of his wife with the other party.58

In State v. Yanz, 59 the court decided to displace the strict requirements of the category-"on finding his wife in the act of adultery''-for the idea of what the defendant actually believes has happened. It is still provocation even if the defendant's belief was mistaken. 50
The excitement is the effect of a belief, from ocular evidence,
of the actual commission of adultery. It is the belief, so reasonably
formed, that excites the uncontrollable passion. Such a belief,
though a mistaken one, is calculated to induce the same emotions

54. See id. at 104.
55. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 579 n.55 (citing various statutes adopting MPC
formulations) (emphasis added).
56. JOHN KAPLAN & ROBERT WEISBERG, CRIMINAL LAW 253 (2d ed. 1991).
57. 18 Tex. Ct. App. 474 (1885).
58. Id. at 481-83.
59. 74 Conn. 177, 50 A. 37 (1901).
60. See KAPLAN & WEISBERG, supra note 56, at 259.
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as would be felt were the wrongful act in fact committed.61

People v. Berry62 offered an expansive interpretation of "taken
in the act of adultery" by treating an admission by the wife of her
own adultery as sufficient and relaxed the definition of the "cooling
period" by treating twenty hours of waiting by the defendant before
the actual act of killing as within the ''heat of passion" requirement.63
I find that the best way to translate the development of these
doctrinal concepts into the terms of passion and honor is to cite at
some length Victoria Nourse's Passion's Progress:
In early modem law, passion was defined by a set of categories
derived from an older social order, indeed, a code of honor .. ..
Adultery was at the center of the categories, the classic source of
adequate provocation, enforcing rules of gender relations grounded
in an older idea of property.
Today in the United States, the law of provocation stands at a
crossroads.... The doctrine is in extraordinary disarray .... Although most jurisdictions have adopted what appears to be a similar "reasonable man" standard, that standard has been applied in
dramatically different ways, with jurisdictions borrowing from both
liberal and traditional theories. Some states require a "sudden"
passion, others allow emotion to build up over time; some reject
claims based on "mere words," others embrace them. Today we are
only safe in saying that in the law of passion, there lie two
poles-one exemplified by the most liberal MPC reforms and the
other by the most traditional categorical view of the common law.
In between these poles, a majority of states borrow liberally from
both traditions. 64

The code of ''honor" that Nourse refers to above, and which she
argues exists in the common-law category of "adultery," is perhaps
even better exemplified by what is known as the unwritten law,65
which when it was written as statute or rule allowed the acquittal
of husbands for such crimes, which it treated as justified. Such
statutes/rules existed in Texas,66 Georgia,67 and New Mexico68

61. Yanz, 50 A. at 39.
62. 415 P.2d 777 (1976).
63. See KAPLAN & WEISBERG, supra note 56, at 264.
64. Nourse, supra note 8, at 1340-42 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
65. In some common-law jurisdictions where the adultery-provocation was the
principle, juries chose nevertheless to acquit the husband who killed to protect his
honor based on a plea of insanity. See KAPLAN & WEISBERG, supra note 56, at 257.
66. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1220 (West 1961) (repealed 1973).
67. See Cloud v. State, 7 S.E. 641, 641-42 (Ga. 1888) (holding that failure to
charge jury that homicide is justifiable when preventing criminal intercourse with
defendant's wife was reversible error). This defense, however, is no longer available.
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until the early seventies when they were all repealed. It is noteworthy that in these statutes/rules, the one committing the killing is
usually the husband, sometimes even the father, 69 and the victim
is the paramour, not the wife, to stop or prevent adultery.
Another way of looking at honor and passion in the American
criminal legal system is to note the tensions inherent in the doctrine structurally. One side of the following structural pairings, I
would argue, represents ''honor'' and the other "passion," existing as
elements of the same legal system:70 justification vs. excuse, objective standard vs. subjective standard, and judges/laws vs. jury.

A. Justification vs. Excuse
In the justification versus excuse doctrinal discussion, writers
struggle with the fact that judges mix and confuse the language of
both justification and excuse in deciding cases of passion where
murder is held to be manslaughter. On one hand, there is enough
"talk" in court decisions to indicate that various courts have viewed
the issue as one of justification.71 All common-law forms of "adequate provocation" can be regarded as justification based since this
approach concentrates on the unlawful conduct of the provoker.72
The conclusion thus is that the violent response by the provoked
party was less socially undesirable than the provocation by the victim-the idea of justification. The attacker in this model is merely
restoring the balance of justice.73 The use of this language is particularly predominant in cases of adultery where sexual unfaithfulness is seen as "the highest invasion of [a husband's] property."74
On the other hand, there is a great deal of "excuse" talk in
these decisions, where the idea is that the harm is the same as in
murder but the accused's personal blameworthiness is less than
that of the murderer. Talk such as ''blind and unreasoning fury'' 75

See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-20 to -40 (1996) (defining defense to criminal prosecution); Chancellor v. State, 301 S.E.2d 294, 297 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) ("Contrary to
appellant's repeated assertion, the slaying of an illicit lover by a wronged spouse in
order to prevent adultery is not justifiable homicide.").
68. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-4 (Allen Smith Co. 1972) (repealed 1973).
69. See supra note 67.
70. This argument is based on comparing these pairings with the ideal types of
honor and passion referred to in Part II of this Article.
71. See, e.g., Selman v. State, 475 S.E.2d 892, 894 (Ga. 1996); People v. Tenner,
626 N.E.2d 138, 151 (Ill. 1993).
72. See Dressler, supra note 20, at 436-37.
73. See id.
74. Regina v. Mawbridge, 84 Eng. Rep. 1107, 1115 (1707).
75. Disney v. State, 73 So. 598, 601 (Fla. 1916).
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a.JJ.d "excite the passion in a reasonable person,"76 puts the stress
on the actor rather than the act. In Maher v. People,77 a man attempted to kill another in a saloon shortly after the victim committed adultery with the attacker's wife. 78 The language of the judgment was such that the blameworthiness of the attacker was significantly suspended:
[I]f the act of killing, though intentional, be committed under
the influence of passion or in heat of blood, produced by an adequate or reasonable provocation, and before a reasonable time has
elapsed for the blood to cool and reason to resume its habitual control, and is the result of the temporary excitement, by which the
control of reason was disturbed, rather than of any wickedness of
heart or cruelty or recklessness of disposition; [the offense is manslaughter only, and not murder]. 79

Fletcher, in his article The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, argues that there is a tendency in the common-law system,
in contrast with the civil law system, to seek justifications for acts
committed.80 Judges, according to Fletcher, need to feel that the
act was morally right or socially utilitarian.81 The judicial construction of the "reasonable man," which, according to him, need not
exist,82 is an indication of the "common law's aversion to excusing
conditions."83
The stark contradiction in the courts' language is put to challenge by Dressler in the following way:
Society [should be required] to directly confront the moral
implications of justifying killings on the basis of the victim's nonhomicidal wrongdoing. The moral question would not be ''hidden" in
the provocation doctrine. It would be necessary to draft a law that
says, in effect:
a homicide which would otherwise be murder is manslaughter
if the victim committed an injustice or wrongdoing for which he
deserved to be the subject of a severe, but not homicidal, response
by another. 84

76. State v. Watkins, 126 N.W. 691, 691 (Iowa 1910).
77. 10 Mich. 212 (1862).
78. See id. at 213-14.
79. Id. at 218-19.
80. See Fletcher, supra note 22, at 1288.
81. See id. at 1280-87.
82. German law, for example, focuses on excusing conditions rather than on the
reasonable man standard. See id. at 1290.
83. Id.
84. Dressler, supra note 20, at 459 (citation omitted). Dressler argues that passion crimes should be based squarely on excuse, and he seeks to cleanse all ideas of
justification from judicial constructions.
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B. Objective vs. Subjective Standards

The modern law of provocation is based on the following formulation, which is an attempt at mediating the subjective and objective: "the defendant must show (i) reasonable provocation, (ii) that
did in fact provoke, (iii) that a reasonable man would not have
cooled off in the interval between the provocation and the fatal
blow, and (iv) that the defendant actually did not cool off."85
The debate here takes one of two forms: the first is a critique of
the objective standard, and the second is an attempt to abolish the
objective standard and adhere to the subjective alone. The critique
of the objective standard argues that the standard is too limited; it
posits that the reasonable man is limited to the idealized male. 86
"Commentators have criticized the reasonable man standard for its
inconsistency, vagueness, dependence on social convention, and
classbound nature."87
There are also those who want the standard abolished altogether. They argue that the "reasonable man" is a judicial fiction that
fails to adequately encapsulate the real "physiology'' of a man in a
situation of provocation (the fight or flight situation), and that deterrence by punishment therefore does not work. 88 Alternatively,
others argue that the objective standard, though expedient, is inherently weak-a weakness that is bound to be exposed when certain
difficult cases arise.89 Those who defend the objective standard do
so because "[i]t requires of the jury an assessment of the seriousness of the provocation, and a judgment as to whether the provocation was grave enough to warrant a reduction of the crime from
murder to manslaughter."90 In other words, the objective standard
is viewed as an attempt to control the category of "passion," so that
not everybody who "flips" can invoke it.
In section 210.3(1)(b), under the title ''Manslaughter," the Model Penal Code attempts to mediate between the subjective and the
objective standards in the following way:
[Manslaughter includes] a homicide which would otherwise be

85.
86.
87.
88.
637-38.
89.

Taylor, supra note 23, at 1687 (citing LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2).
See id.
See id. at 1688 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Peter Brett, The Physiology of Provocation, 1970 CRIM. L. REV. 634,

See, e.g., J.LL.J. Edwards, Provocation and the Reasonable Man, 1954 CRIM.

L. REV. 898, 906.

90. A.J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292, 318
(1976).
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murder [if] committed under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or
excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be
determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation
under circumstances as he believes them to be.91

C. Judge/Law vs. Jury

In this debate, juries are characterized as lenient and freewheeling in their treatment of provocation cases, where they tend to
acquit defendants as opposed to merely reducing the sentence.92
This is based on juries' acceptance of defenses (such as an insanity
plea) that judges would never accept as a matter of law because the
strict standards of provocation do not prevail.93 Also, where juries
concentrate on subjective elements in situations of provocation with
little regard for objective considerations applied by judges, the characterization finds support.
In State v. Remus,94 the defendant, who killed his wife while
divorce proceedings were pending, managed to convince a jury that
he was insane when he committed the crime.95 He did so by soliciting the jury's sympathy for him on the basis of evidence he introduced proving that his wife was cheating on him and that she and
her lover were conspiring to deprive him of his property.96 In this
case, the defendant was unable to plead provocation.97
Some commentators argue that to curb and control the jury's
sloppiness, legislatures should codify the "unwritten law," thereby
reducing the jury's room to maneuver.98 Codification would also
allow the state to later change the law:
There are advantages for a state willing to commit the "unwritten law" to writing.... If the state asserts that it is the source
of the legality of a practice, that assertion may gradually be accepted, and the state, as source of the law, may be able to change it.
Further, if an act of violence must be tolerated, it is better for the

91. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (emphasis
added).
92. See generally W. Lewis Roberts, The Unwritten Law, 10 KY. L.J. 45, 48-49
(1922).
93. See Comment, Recognition of the Honor Defense Under the Insanity Plea, 43
YALE L.J. 809, 811-12 (1934) (advocating legislative acceptance of honor defense to
elinlinate its use as insanity defense).
94. See id. at 812 (citing State v. Remus, No. 29969 (Ohio Com. Pleas 1927)).
95. See id. (citing State v. Remus, No. 29969 (Ohio Com. Pleas 1927)).
96. See id. (citing State v. Remus, No. 29969 (Ohio Com. Pleas 1927)).
97. See id.
98. See, e.g., Jeremy D. Weinstein, Note, Adultery, Law, and the State: A History, 38 HAsTINGS L.J. 195, 230 (1986).
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state if the act is seen as conforming with the law of the state.99
V. WHEN THE HONOR OF THE EAST Is THE PASSION OF THE WEST

One way the Jordanian courts chose to resolve the tension
between passion and honor inherent in Article 340 of the Jordanian
Penal Code100 was to resort to Article 98101 in the Code to avoid
the restrictions of flagrante delicto and that the killing should be
immediate-those being necessary elements of the classical crime of
passion. 102 The effect of this judicial "detour'' was to waive these
requirements, thereby allowing a crime of honor in the more classical sense to be tolerated. 103 In other words, the Jordanian Judiciary decided to unshackle the crime of honor from the "passion"
requirements that the legislature had included in the complicated
structure of Article 340/2 of the Code. Thus, fathers could kill their
daughters after hearing that they were pregnant, and brothers
could kill sisters two days after hearing that they were committing
adultery, 104 and still manage to be granted total excuse. The Egyptian and Syrian judiciary followed different judicial detours producing similar effects. 105
In the United States, in the jurisdictions applying the EED
defense-one that is committed to protecting the "choosing self'106
whereby defendants are presumed to be less culpable when they
lose "self-control"107-manslaughter verdicts were returned in situations that would never be legally tolerated if the traditional common-law category of adultery were the standard. Thus, Nourse
states:
A significant number of the reform cases I studied involve no sexual infidelity whatsoever, but only the desire of the killer's victim to
leave a miserable relationship. Reform108 has permitted juries to
return a manslaughter verdict in cases where the defendant claims
passion because the victim left, moved the furniture out, planned a

99. Id.
100. See Abu-Odeh, supra note 1, at 143-44.
101. Article 98 of the Jordanian Penal Code provides: "He who commits a crime
in a fit of fury caused by an unrightful and dangerous act on the part of the victim
benefits from a reduction of penalty." JORDANIAN PENAL CODE art. 98 (No. 16, 1960).
102. See supra Part II.
103. See supra Part II.
104. See Abu-Odeh, supra note 1, at 159-60.
105. See id.
106. Nourse, supra note 8, at 1336.
107. Id. at 1333.
108. Nourse refers to reforms that promise greater humanity and consistency that
have moved lawyers to reject the older talk of heat of passion in favor of the more
modern one of emotional distress. See id. at 1332.
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divorce, or sought a protective order. Even infidelity has been
transformed under reform's gaze into something quite different
from the sexual betrayal we might expect-it is the infidelity of a
fiancee who danced with another, of a girlfriend who decided to
date someone else, and of the divorcee found pursuing a new relationship months after the final decree. In the end, reform has
transformed passion from the classical adultery to the modern
dating moving and leaving.109

In a movement quite the reverse of what happened in the Arab
world, self-understood as a move from honor to passion, the tight
embrace of the various elements constituting the provocation defense according to the common law....,....killing committed in a heat of
passion as a result of adequate provocation when no cooling time
has elapsed-has been relaxed. The result is the dim picture skillfully painted by Nourse in the quote above. On the face of it, the
move is ''liberal." It aims at delegitimating the code of honor of the
nineteenth century, whereby women were seen as the property of
men, in favor of a more humanizing world where people's emotions
are taken into account. Ironically, Nourse argues, this humanizing
move has effectively changed the relationship of women to men
from that of property to that of "emotional unity'' therewith. It ties
women to relationships they seek to abandon and punishes them for
leaving miserable arrangements.110 Nourse then makes the striking conclusion that "it should not be surprising to learn that the
common law approach toward the provocation defense, deemed an
antique by most legal scholars, provides greater protection for women than do purportedly liberal versions of the defense."111 Even
more striking is the fact that it was the paramour that was getting
killed during the days of honor. Now it's women-wives, ex-wives,
girlfriends, ex-girlfriends.
Rather than a dividing line separating them, "East" and ''West"
seem to meet in a circular movement where one becomes the other.
The ''honor'' of nineteenth-century America is the very "passion"
incorporated in the Arab Codes to diffuse and decenter the other
legal sensibility lurking in the structure of the Codes-Arab ''honor." This legislative strategy seemed to fail due to the Arab
judiciary's effort to recenter Arab ''honor." The reverse movement in
the US, whereby the effort of reform to decenter American ''honor"
has been largely successful, American "passion" unleashed merges
with Arab honor released: more women are killed, for "provocative"

109. Id. at 1332-33 (footnotes omitted).
110. See id. at 1335.
111. Id. at 1334.
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acts more numerous, after more time has passed, based on evidence
more tentative. The twain East and West, when it comes to violence
against women, meet.
·
VI. CONCLUSION

One basic difference, however, remains: most women killed in
the Arab world are daughters and sisters, and in the United States
it's wives and girlfriends. This actual cultural difference makes
incomprehensible the title of Melissa Spatz's article: A Lesser
Crime: A Comparative Study of Legal Defenses for Men Who Kill
Their Wives. 112 Using a radical feminist perspective, Spatz discusses legislation and precedent in various Arab and Islamic countries as well as Brazil, India, and the United States, dealing with
the defenses permitted to men who kill their wives. 113 What is
anomalous about the case of the Arab countries is that the legal
locus of these crimes is less the immediate legislation and more the
general provocation rule found in almost every Arab Penal
Code. 114 Also of significance, in the Arab world, husbands killing
their wives, as I indicated above, is a rare phenomenon compared to
the killing of daughters and sisters. This fact is dealt with by Spatz
only marginally in a footnote. 115 Spatz seems to project the United
States context (men killing wives) onto what happens in the Arab
world by using an "internationalistic" radical feminist approach,
thereby revealing a blindness to cultural differences.
An even more anomalous aspect of Spatz's article is that her
discussion of the United States mentions only cases involving immigrants in the United States who have killed their wives or daughters, and who use the "cultural defense," instead of discussing the
classical cases of provocation or heat of passion. 116 By failing to
discuss passion crimes in the United States, Spatz seems to presume the superiority of the American judicial system. In other
words, she seems to say "these things simply don't happen in this
country unless immigrants bring it in with them." This is an
orientalist117 position par excellence. And so, in this article, although the United States is strongly present through the writer's

112. See Spatz, supra note 6.
113. See id. at 598-627.
114. See id. at 602 (using direct legislative provisions as material for study).
115. See id. at 599 n.4.
116. Spatz discusses two cases: a New York case involving a Chinese man who
murdered his wife when she confessed to having an affair and a Florida case involving a Greek man who murdered his daughter's rapist. See id. at 621-27.
117. See supra text accompanying note 4.
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projections on other parts of the world (in assuming that the problem everywhere is that men kill their wives), the United States
itself is insulated from discussion and critique because of the
writer's orientalist assumptions of American superiority.

